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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)0), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3, this
Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Questions Presented
1. Was summary judgment proper when the lower court held that adverse

possession cannot be used to extinguish an easement by necessity?
2. Was Summary judgment proper assuming, arguendo, that adverse possession
can extinguish an easement by necessity, when the lower court held the seven-year
statutory period for adverse possession does not apply to the adverse possession of an
easement by necessity?
3. Was summary judgment proper when the lower court held that Appellant failed
to adversely possess the easement by necessity for 20 years?
4. Was summary judgment proper when the lower court held that the easement by
necessity had not been abandoned?
B.

Standard of Review
Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, a trial court's legal

conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed for correctness. Walker
Drug Co., Inc. v La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Appellee's property is landlocked except for an access way that has existed along

the eastern boundary of Appellant's property for purposes of ingress and egress to and
from Appellee's property. (R 50.) Appellee claims an easement by necessity along this
access way. (R2-4.)
Appellant claims that Appellee's easement by necessity was abandoned in the late
1930fs or early 1940fs and that, in any event, Appellee's easement by necessity was lost
through adverse possession. (R 84-102, 198-229.)
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court
Appellee filed his Complaint August 4, 1997. (R 1.) Shortly thereafter, Appellee

and Appellant both moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Appellee's
motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant's cross-motion for summary
judgment. (R 288-295.)
The district court ruled that (a) Appellee did not abandon the easement by
necessity, and that (b) Appellant did not adversely possess the easement by necessity
because (i) the 20-year period for a prescriptive easement applies to adverse possession of
an easement by necessity rather than the seven-year statutory period for adverse
possession, and (ii) Appellant's adverse possession only occurred over a period of 15
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years, rather than the required 20 years. (R 293-294.)
C.

Material Facts
Appellee owns a one-acre parcel of land in Sanpete County which he acquired in

1986. (R 219, ^f 28.) Appellee's property is surrounded on three sides by Appellant's 20acre parcel of land which Appellant acquired in 1992. (R 103, 219,fflf21, 28.)
Appellee's property and Appellant's property have a unity of title. (R 50.) Appellee's
parcel is adjoined on a fourth side by the property of a third party which has a different
origin of title than Appellee's property. (R 289).
There is an old home and farm buildings located on Appellee's property.
Appellee's occupancy dates back to 1902, though the home has not been occupied for a
half century or so. There is a county road along the north side of Appellant's property.
(R 217, 219fflj21, 28.) When Appellee's home and/or property was used, Mower and his
predecessors-in-interest had access to the county road across Appellant's property.
Appellee has used his property on numerous occasions over the years for hunting,
recreation and other purposes such as pasturing his horses and storing farm equipment,
beginning from when he was a boy up until approximately 1996, just prior to the filing of
the present litigation. (R 231 ^ 1.) Appellee has also, at times, driven his vehicle across
the access way. (R 231 ^ 3.) Appellee accessed his property, for the above-described
uses, through a gate or opening in Appellant's fence.
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At times from the late 1930fs or early 1940fs to the 1990fs, Appellant and her
predecessors cultivated the area covered by the old access road and treated it as part of the
adjoining field. (R 217, ^ 18.) Sometime in 1982, members of Appellee's family sought
to cross the Appellant's property to access Appellee's property, but were confronted by
the owner at that time, Mr. Norton, who refused to allow the crossing unless a court order
was obtained. (R 213, ^J 4.) This incident eventually prompted Appellee's lawsuit.
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There are four reasons why the lower court's summary judgment award was
proper. First, adverse possession cannot be used to extinguish an easement by necessity.
Although caselaw may allow adverse possession to extinguish an express easement, no
case has allowed the adverse possession of an easement by necessity. This is because
public policy disfavors using adverse possession to extinguish easements by necessity,
and because easements by necessity are extinguished only when the necessity ceases or if
the easement holder relinquishes the easement.
Second, assuming, arguendo, that adverse possession can extinguish an easement
by necessity, Utah's 20-year common law period for a prescriptive easement applies to
Appellant's adverse possession claim which Appellant cannot satisfy. The prescriptive
period applies to this situation because (i) this Court and other jurisdictions have already
held that the adverse possession's statutory seven-year period is inapplicable to
easements; (ii) the seven-year statutory adverse possession period cannot be relied on to
create a prescriptive easement because it has a different statutory scheme than the
doctrine of prescriptive easements; and (iii) even if the adverse possession doctrine could
apply, Appellant has failed to establish all of the adverse possession requirements.
Third, assuming Utah's 20-year common law period for a prescriptive easement
applies, Appellant has failed to adversely possess the easement by necessity for 20 years.
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Finally, summary judgment by the court below was proper because the claimed
easement by necessity has not been abandoned based on decisive and clear conduct by the
Appellee.
V. ARGUMENT
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE ADVERSE
POSSESSION CANNOT BE USED TO EXTINGUISH AN EASEMENT BY
NECESSITY
Appellant begins her brief with the statutory requirements for adverse possession

and then launches into her claim that the seven-year statutory adverse possession period
should have been used by the lower court instead of the 20-year common law period.
Contrary to Appellant's presumption that the doctrine of adverse possession can
extinguish an easement by necessity, caselaw from Utah and other jurisdictions, public
policy, and the court below have concluded otherwise.
1.

Public Policy Disfavors Extinguishing Easements by Necessity by
Adverse Possession

Appellant has presented no authority, and indeed none exists, for the proposition
that adverse possession can extinguish an easement by necessity. Indeed, the very
concept is wholly contrary to the policy supporting the doctrine of easements by
necessity:
The right to claim an easement by necessity may lie dormant over a long period of
time and may be finally activated when the facts giving rise to the necessity arise.
The right to claim this kind of an easement passes with the dominant property to
-6-

each successive possessor until the landlocked situation arises and the easement by
necessity is claimed.
James Backman & David Thomas, A Practical Guide to Disputes Between Adjoining
Landowners - Easements § 2.02[3][b][i], at 2-8 to 2-9. To hold that adverse possession
can extinguish an easement by necessity would entirely defeat the purpose of the doctrine
of easements by necessity. Indeed, an easement by necessity is created when the
dominant landowner has a need to access his property through that of the servient
landowner. Terminating the easement while the need still remains would render the
dominant landowner's property useless - the likely reason that no authority exists in
support of such an action.1 This is true with the instant case. If the Court rules as
Appellant argues, Appellee's property would be rendered useless due to his inability to
gain access to it - a concept repugnant to traditional notions of property ownership. Put
another way, if the Appellant prevails, Appellee will need to purchase and use a
helicopter to access his property.
The Wyoming Supreme Court discussed the public policy disfavoring denial of a

1

Although Appellant cited no cases in support of the presumption that adverse possession
can extinguish an easement by necessity, cases addressing the termination of an easement
through adverse possession all deal with expressly granted easements. See, e.g., Beebe v.
Swerda, 793 P.2d 442 (Wash. App. 1990); Citv of Edmonds v. Williams. 774 P.2d 1241 (Wash.
App. 1989); Mueller v. Hoblvn. 887 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1994); Kolouch v. Kramer, 813 P.2d 876
(Idaho 1991); Sabino Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Cam 920 P.2d 26 (Ariz. App. 1996);
Castle Associates v. Schwarz, 407 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y. App. 1978); Okemo Mountain, Inc. v.
Town of Ludlow. 671 A.2d 1263 (Vt. 1995).
-7-

landowner access to his landlocked property in Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 507
(Wyo. 1994), where it held that, "Just as the creation of an easement by prescription is not
favored in the law, the termination of an easement by adverse possession is not favored."
See also, City of Edmonds, supra, 11A P.2d at 1243 (holding, "Termination of easements
is disfavored under the law."); see, also, Sabino Town & Country Estates, supra, 920 P.2d
at 29.
In Whinnerv v. Thompson. 868 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Colo. App. 1993) (reversed on
other grounds), the court held that a prescriptive easement/adverse possession claim could
not extinguish an easement by necessity because, by definition, the easement by necessity
predated the prescriptive easement/adverse possession claim:
Even if adverse and prescriptive use could be shown, a claim for a prescriptive
easement cannot defeat a claim for a preexisting easement by necessity, as to
the same right-of-way. This is because the easement of necessity must, by
definition, have pre-dated the existence of the subsequent easement by prescription
by at least 18 years. Thus, as concerning the same right-of-way, the existence of
elements necessary to establish an easement by prescription cannot, as a matter of
law, preclude the existence of an easement by necessity previously acquired.
(Emphasis added). Thus, due to the glaring lack of authority in support of Appellant's
presumption, the fact that extinguishing easements by necessity with the adverse
possession doctrine is highly disfavored, and because a ruling in favor of Appellant would
force Appellee to use a helicopter to access his landlocked property, the Court should
affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgment.
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2.

Easements by Necessity Are Extinguished Only When the Necessity
Ceases or if the Easement Holder Relinquishes the Easement

Another reason adverse possession should not apply to easements by necessity is
because caselaw provides just two instances when an easement by necessity is lost: when
the necessity ceases or when the easement holder relinquishes the easement. Consider the
following:
>* In Berkeley Dev. Corp. v. Hutzler. 229 S.E.2d 732 (W.Va. 1976), the court
emphasized the necessity requirement and stated that once created, such an
easement "cannot be extinguished so long as the necessity continues to exist."
I d at 851 (emphasis added) (quoted in United States v. Srnskv, 271 F.3d 595, 599
(4th Cir. 2001)). The Srnsky court also held that, "Unlike easements by necessity,
these rights by implication 'could be lost only by adverse possession by the owner
of the servient land.'" Id
>* In Mover v.Martin, 101 W. Va. 19, 23-24 (1926), the court held that, "The
right of way is not one of necessity which may be extinguished when the
necessity ceases by the acquirement of another equally convenient route or the
purchase of other property which affords ready ingress and egress." (Emphasis
added).
>*

In Wanbun Beach Ass'n v. Wilson. 274 Mich. 598, 609 (1936), the court

held that, "The right of way being one of strict necessity, if such right exists at all,
and not one of mere convenience, it ceases with the necessity." (Emphasis
added).
»* In Powers v. Heffernan. 84 N.E. 661, 664 (111. 1908), the court held that,
"Necessity for, and right of, access may indeed be relinquished by express words
clearly indicating an intention to do so . . . "
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Thus, according to the caselaw above, because the necessity for Appellee's access
to his property has not ceased and Appellee has not relinquished the necessity, Appellee's
easement by necessity cannot be extinguished.
B.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ALSO PROPER BECAUSE ASSUMING,
ARGUENDO, THAT ADVERSE POSSESSION CAN EXTINGUISH AN
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY, THE SEVEN-YEAR STATUTORY PERIOD
FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE ADVERSE
POSSESSION OF AN EASEMENT BY NECESSITY
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court holds adverse possession applicable to an

easement by necessity, the seven-year statutory period for adverse possession does not
apply (1) according to courts in Utah and in other jurisdictions, (2) the seven-year
statutory adverse possession period cannot be relied on to create a prescriptive easement
because it has a different statutory scheme than the doctrine of prescriptive easements,
and (3) adverse possession cannot be relied on because Appellant has not satisfied all of
its elements.
1.

The Utah Supreme Court and Other Jurisdictions Have Already Held
that the Adverse Possession's Seven-Year Statutory Period is
Inapplicable to Easements

Generally, the requirements to terminate an easement by adverse possession are the
same as those to acquire a prescriptive easement. In Beebe v. Swerda. 793 P.2d 442
(Wash. App. 1990), the court held that
[w]hile it is legally possible for an easement to be terminated by adverse use for
the prescriptive period by the owner of the servient tenement,... the elements
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required to do so are the same elements that must be found in order to obtain an
easement through adverse possession.2
IcL at 446 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In Mueller v. Hoblvn. 887 P.2d 500, 509
(Wyo. 1994), the court held that an easement extinguished by adverse possession must be
adversely possessed pursuant to the prescriptive period of the state (i.e. 10 years in
Wyoming). Also, the Restatements on Property § 506 also requires the period of
prescription, rather than a statutory period, for extinguishing an easement:
An easement is extinguished by a use of the servient tenement by the possessor
of it which would be privileged if, and only if, the easement did not exist,
provided
(a) the use is adverse as to the owner of the easement and
(b) the adverse use is, for the period of prescription, continuous and
uninterrupted.
(Emphasis added). Therefore, to show that an easement by necessity has been adversely
possessed, Appellant would have to satisfy the requirements of the prescriptive period in
Utah which is 20 years. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998) (stating Utah's
prescriptive period is 20 years).
2

Appellant attempts to distinguish this language in Beebe by pointing to the sentence after
this one which reads: "To establish prescriptive rights by adverse possession, the claimant must
show use which was open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse to the owner for the
statutory period." Beebe, 793 P.2d at 446-47 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). However,
unlike Utah, Washington's adverse possession statutory period and its prescriptive easement
period are both ten years, and governed by the same statute (Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §
4.16.020). See, e.g. Mountaineers v. Wvmer. 355 P.2d 341 (Wash. 1960) (holding that the
period required to establish a right-of-way easement by prescription is governed by ARCW §
4.16.020). This explains the Washington Supreme Court's use of "statutory period" in
conjunction with the elements to a prescriptive easement.
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In addition to caselaw from other jurisdictions holding that the prescriptive period
(rather than the adverse
possession period) should apply to the adverse possession of an easement, this Court has
previously held that Utah's adverse possession statute does not apply to certain classes of
easements: "This statute [U.C.A. §§ 78-12-8 and -12] does not apply to rights of way or
any other class of easement by prescription." Harkness v. Woodmansee. 7 Utah 227, 231
(Utah 1891). The Harkness court further held that "a prescriptive right cannot arise in
favor of the Appellees" from the adverse possession statutes. Id Logically, if Utah's
adverse possession statutes cannot be used to create prescriptive rights, they cannot be
used to extinguish prescriptive rights.
Appellant, apparently realizing the precedent Harkness provides to the case at bar,
expends considerable effort to distinguish Harkness. Appellant claims Harkness is
inapplicable because:
a party claiming a prescriptive easement cannot obtain such an easement after the
7-year period for adverse possession has passed. The territorial court's statement
in Harkness has nothing to do with whether the 7-year statute of limitations under
Utah's adverse possession statute applies to extinguishment of an easement by
adverse possession.
(See, Appellant's brief, pg. 13-14). Thus, Appellant's illogical attempt to distinguish
Harkness is: Harkness applies to the obtaining of an easement by adverse possession, not
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extinguishing an easement by adverse possession. Appellant provides no rationale of its
own, or from Harkness, to support this reading of Harkness.
The reason is clear. The Harkness court, after reviewing the statutory elements to
the adverse possession statute, simply stated that, "This statute does not apply to rights of
way or any other class of easement by prescription." Id, at 231. The Harkness holding
should carry this appeal.
2.

The Seven-Year Statutory Adverse Possession Period Cannot Be Relied
on to Create a Prescriptive Easement Because it Has a Different
Statutory Scheme than the Doctrine of Prescriptive Easements

Assuming the Court follows the Washington and Wyoming supreme courts by
applying the prescriptive easement elements to the adverse possession of an easement by
necessity, the fundamental difference between prescriptive easements and adverse
possession is another reason to use the 20-year prescriptive easement period. The
doctrine of adverse possession relates to the acquisition of the basic fee title to a piece of
property. Marchant v. Park City. 771 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah App. 1989). However,
Prescriptive easements and easements by necessity, although different, relate to the use of
another's title rather than obtaining fee title. Id
In the case at bar, Appellant already owns title to the strip of land at issue. She is
now simply trying to terminate Appellee's use thereof. In Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Co. v. Movie, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946), Chief Justice Larson explained in his concurring
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opinion the fundamental difference between adverse possession and prescriptive
easements:
The difference in time - seven years to acquire title and twenty to acquire an
easement - stands logically upon the difference in the nature and extent of the
possession and use. In title cases founded on adverse possession there must be a
complete and exclusive exercise of dominion by the claimant, or interloper, for
seven years - which is deemed sufficient time to establish the adverse nature of the
claim. However, in acquiring prescriptive easements, since the owner of the
servient estates is only partially disposed — that is, there is only a limited
interference with his property (the right of exclusive possession and use) a
longer period is required to establish that the use or claim in the property is adverse
and not permissive.
Id. at 162-63. Again, Appellee is the interloper using Appellant's land for ingress and
egress. Appellant is the owner of the servient estate and is only partially disposed of the
strip of land due to Appellee's use. Thus, Appellant should extinguish Appellee's use
with her own adverse use, not her own adverse possession since she already owns the
land in question.
Because of the fundamental differences between adverse possession and
prescriptive easements, and the similarities between prescriptive easements and
easements by necessity, the 20-year period of a prescriptive easement should apply to
Appellant's efforts to extinguish Appellee's easement by necessity instead of the statutory
adverse possession period.
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3.

Appellant Has Failed to Establish All of the Adverse Possession
Requirements

Aside from the statutory seven-year period required for adverse possession in
Utah, Appellant must also show under adverse possession that her use was exclusive and
adverse. U.C.A §§ 78-12-8 and -12. Appellant cannot satisfy these two requirements.
a.

Exclusive Use Requirement

In addition to showing adverse possession for a certain length of time - whether
seven or 20 years - Appellant must use the property at issue "exclusive of other right."
U.C.A. § 78-12-8. Appellant's claimed exclusive use of the property, however, is
insufficient to establish such an adverse use.
Appellant testified in his deposition that he used the easement on numerous
occasions, some within the seven years prior to this lawsuit being filed in July of 1997.
(R 231fflf1,3.) Appellee has not refuted this use, but simply ignores it. Taken as such,
Appellee's testimony regarding his use is an established fact, which precludes Appellant's
exclusive adverse use.
b.

Adverse Use Requirement

Another adverse possession requirement is that Appellee's use must be hostile and
adverse. Appellant claims to have adversely used her property for agricultural and
grazing purposes, and claims to have maintained a boundary fence on the property. (See,
Appellant's Brief, pgs. 16-17). This is the extent of Appellant's claimed hostile and
-15-

adverse use of the strip of land at issue. Accepting Appellant's claims as true for the sake
of argument, it is clear based on the following caselaw that this use is insufficiently
adverse to terminate Appellee's easement through adverse possession.3
In Mueller, supra, the servient estate owner, Mueller, claimed that an express
easement granted to Hoblyn and Coffee had been extinguished through adverse
possession. The Supreme Court of Wyoming disagreed, finding that Mueller's use of the
property burdened by the easement was not sufficiently adverse to terminate the easement
by adverse possession. Mueller's use of the property consisted of maintaining boundary
fencing, making agricultural use of the property, and drilling and maintaining a water well
on the portion of the property that contained the easement. The Mueller court stated that
"Mueller's actions in maintaining boundary fencing, growing various crops and drilling
the water well did not terminate any portion of the easement by adverse possession." Id.
In Cam supra, 920 P.2d at 30-31, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the
servient estate owner's erecting and maintaining a fence within the defendant's easement
was not sufficiently hostile and adverse to the defendant's interest to terminate the
easement through adverse possession.
In Kolouch, supra, 813 P.2d at 878, the servient landowner had placed six trees in

3

Although Appellant relies on U.C.A. § 78-12-9 to establish her adverse use, as the Utah
Supreme Court has already held, Utah's adverse possession statutes do not apply to rights of way
or prescriptive easements. Harkness, supra, 1 Utah at 231.
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the easement, constructed a fence inside the boundary of the easement, constructed a
concrete diversion system on one end of the easement, and placed several large boulders
on the easement. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Idaho explained that such acts were
still insufficient to establish adverse use:
Since the owner of the servient estate owns the underlying fee, and has the right to
use his entire land for any purposes not inconsistent with the rights of the holder of
the dominant easement, the use by the servient estate must be truly inconsistent [in
order to terminate the easement through adverse possession.]
Id. at 879. The court then concluded that the servient landowner's use of the land was not
sufficiently inconsistent with the contemplated use of the easement to terminate it through
adverse possession. IdL at 880.
In sum, even if an easement by necessity could be terminated by adverse
possession, as a matter of law Appellant's claimed use of the property is insufficiently
exclusive and adverse to the use contemplated by the easement. Accordingly, Appellant's
adverse possession argument should fail as a matter of law.
C.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE APPELLANT
FAILED TO ADVERSELY POSSESS THE CLAIMED EASEMENT FOR 20
YEARS
Appellant next claims that she has adversely used the claimed easement for over

30 years. In support, Appellant claims that the Notions (her predecessors-in-interest)
blocked off the claimed easement with a fence, Appellant (and the Notions) prohibited

-17-

anyone's use of the claimed easement, Appellant allowed her animals to graze on the
claimed easement, and Appellant plowed and planted grass on the claimed easement.
(See, Appellant's Brief, pgs. 16-17).
However, as an initial matter, because the servient tenant owns the land upon
which the easement is located and the easement holder has a right to use that land, the
adversity standard is more strictly construed in easement cases than with "general"
adverse possession of land:
To extinguish an easement over (or use of) the servient tenements, the servient
tenement owner must demonstrate a visible, notorious and continuous adverse and
hostile use of said land which is inconsistent with the use made and rights held by
the easement holder, not merely possession which is inconsistent with another's
claim of title.
Mueller, supra, 887 P.2d at 507 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Because of this
heightened standard, Johnson v. Bell 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983) - a case cited by
Appellant in support of her supposed adverse use - is inapplicable. Johnson was an
adverse possession case rather than an easement case.
Additionally, other courts faced with this issue have held that possession is not
adverse until the owner of the dominant estate demands that the easement be
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opened. Kolouch. supra, 813 P.2d at 8794; Castle Associates v Schwartz, 407 N.Y.S.2d
717, 723 (1978).
Assuming this to be the law in Utah, the mere possession of the easement by
Appellant's predecessors in interest (the Nortons), the erection and maintenance of a
fence, plowing and grazing of the strip of land cannot be deemed sufficiently adverse
until the attempt of Mrs. Mower to cross the property that was denied in 1982. This
would have been the soonest demand by Appellee to open the easement. The prescriptive
clock began at that time and had not reached twenty years when Appellee reasserted his
right to the easement by filing this lawsuit.
D.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE CLAIMED
EASEMENT HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED
Appellant's final claim on appeal is that Appellee abandoned his claimed

easement. However, based on the standard required for abandonment of an easement,
Appellant has failed to marshal sufficient facts to establish a claim for abandonment.
As stated above, based on public policy, courts are reluctant to destroy property
rights by reason of abandonment, particularly when it renders a property inaccessible and

4

The Kolouch court held that, "where an easement has been created but no
occasion has arisen for its use, the owner of the servient tenement may fence his land and
such use will not be deemed adverse to the existence of the easement until such time as
(1) the need for the right of way arises, (2) a demand is made by the owner of the
dominant tenement that the easement be opened and (3) the owner of the servient
tenement refuses to do so." Id. at 879.
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unusable. Additionally, the potential dormancy of an easement by necessity militates
against abandonment.5
Careful not to offend this public policy, courts have fashioned the following rules
for terminating easements.
The general rule on abandonment of an easement is that abandonment requires the
intent to abandon. See Restatement of Property §504 (1944). Furthermore, "[m]ere nonuse does not suffice to prove abandonment.... There must be other evidence of a
clear intent to abandon." Thompson on Real Property § 60.08(b)(3) (Thomas Ed. 1994)
(emphasis added). This is the rule in Utah, as set forth in Western Gateway Storage Co.
v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977) which held that "a right gained by conveyance
may not be lost by non-use alone and that an actual intent to abandon [must] be evident."
Id. at 182. "Abandonment of an easement requires an intentional relinquishment
indicated by conduct which discloses the intention to surrender the right to use the land
authorized by the easement." Mueller, supra, 887 P.2d at 505; see, also, Treseder. supra,

5

The potential for dormancy of an easement by necessity is, again, described as follows:

The right to claim an easement by necessity may lie dormant over a long period of time
and may be finally activated when the facts giving rise to the necessity arise. The right to
claim this kind of an easement passes with the dominant property to each successive
possessor until the landlocked situation arises and the easement by necessity is claimed.
James Backman & David Thomas, A Practical Guide to Disputes Between Adjoining
Landowners - Easements § 2.02[3][b][i], at 2-8 to 2-9.
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567 P.2d at 182. The focus of the abandonment inquiry is on Appellee's conduct, not
the conduct of Appellant Pencader Assoc, Inc. v. Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097, 1100
(Del. 1982). Finally, one leading authority explained the standard for abandonment as
follows:
The vast majority of cases take the position that an easement, whether by grant or
by prescription, cannot be lost by mere nonuse, however long continued, unless
accompanied by an affirmative act on the part of the owner of the easement
indicating an unequivocal intention to abandon it, and the acts claimed to
constitute the abandonment must be of a character so decisive and conclusive as to
indicate a clear intent to abandon the easement.
Jennifer L. Romeo, Annotation, Loss of Private Easement by Nonuse, 62 A.L.R.5th 219,
§ 2a (1998) (emphasis added). In sum, Appellant must prove that Appellee intended to
abandon the claimed easement with decisive and conclusive acts which evidence a clear,
unequivocal intent to abandon. Simple non-use is insufficient. Appellant cannot satisfy
this standard.
Appellant provides the following supposed evidence of abandonment:
^

Appellee acknowledged through correspondence that the house had been

abandoned. (See, Appellant's Brief, pgs. 21-23). However, this assumes that if the
house is abandoned, the property must also be abandoned, which ignores the obvious
possibility that the property has other uses besides as a residence. Appellee has testified
that he has used the property to hunting, recreation, and pasturing his animals. (R 231 f 1).
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>^

The previous occupants of Appellee's property movedfrom the property in

the late 1930fs or early 1940's after which animals inhabited the house; no one lived in
the house, or used the property or claimed easement from that time until early the early
1980's. Id This allegation, however, only discusses non-use of the house, non-use of the
easement, and the previous occupants' conduct. Moreover, such allegations fail to show
Appellee's intent to abandon the easement, but simply show non-use.
>* Appellant fenced off the claimed easement and let no one use it. Id This is
simply a description of Appellant's conduct, and again, goes to the non-use of the claimed
easement. No evidence is provided of Appellee's conduct evidencing a clear intent to
abandon the easement.
>*

A huge rock pile has existed on Appellee's property since the mid-19601 s. Id.

Appellee implies with this allegation that the property is therefore either unusable or not
in use. Non-use is insufficient evidence of abandonment. Moreover, how is this clear
and unequivocal evidence of Appellee's intent to abandon the easement? Is it possible
that Appellee simply does not want to incur the cost of removing the rock pile?
>*

Appellant plowed and planted grass within the claimed easement and let

animals graze there. Id This is evidence of Appellant's use of the claimed easement, not
clear and unequivocal evidence of Appellee's intent to abandon the easement.
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>*

The Nortons (predecessors to Appellant) did not notice the claimed

easement. Id. Again, this is an allegation related to the Nortons and their perception of
the claimed easement, rather than clear and unequivocal evidence of Appellee's intent to
abandon the easement.
In sum, the supposed clear and unequivocal evidence of Appellee's intent to
abandon the claimed easement is either evidence of non-use or evidence of other's
conduct. As the court below held, "Defendant's claim of abandonment relies solely upon
evidence of non-use. She offers nothing evidencing an affirmative manifestation of
intent to abandon on Mower's part." (See, Order, pg. 4 which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A) (emphasis added).
In addition to the foregoing factual allegations, Appellant relies on a number of
cases in support of her abandonment argument - all of which are distinguishable. The
first is Sindlar v. William M. Bailer Co.. 204 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1965) which concerned
an old road that was expressly reserved as an easement in a conveyance to the dominate
estate, rather than an easement by necessity. Although the Sindlar court mentioned the
servient estate owner's erection of fencing across the claimed easement, the court relied
heavily upon permanent changes to the claimed easement in holding the easement had
been abandoned:
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However, in our view, the case at bar is a much more convincing instance of
abandonment than the Desotell case. Here, the respondent must cross Spot Pond
Brook in order to use the disputed area for access to its land which abuts the
northern segment of Abbott Street. It appears, however, that the wooden planks
which spanned the brook at Abbott Street in 1935 have disappeared, and that,
since then, the brook has been increased in width and there has been no bridge at
that critical point. The banks of the brook are from six to twelve feet high.
Rubbish lies in the brook's bed.
Id. at 719-720 (emphasis added). Thus, not only does Sindlar deal with an express
easement (rather than an easement by necessity), but Sindlar dealt with permanent
changes to the easement which made accessing it (i.e. crossing over a 50-foot wide brook
without a bridge) impossible. No such permanent changes exist in the case at bar.
Appellant next cites Comeau v. Manselli, 182 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. 1962). In this
case, Comeau received an express easement that almost ran up to a nearby road, but
stopped short at Manselli's property - 35 to 40 feet short of the nearby road. Id. at 490.
Not only was this not an easement by necessity, but the Comeau court held, "There is no
indication that this [express] easement was intended as a connection between [Comeau's]
parcel D and the way. The way is neither mentioned in the deed nor depicted on the plan."
[d. at 490. It was in this context that the Comeau court held the easement was abandoned
- because it was not necessary, it did not expressly cross the defendant's property to the
nearby road, and because of an impassable railroad fence that barred Comeau's access
across Manselli's property: "The railroad fence has no gate or way location, has always
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been barred at Pleasant Street, and is impassable. Trees are in the area and iron posts are
on the street...." Id at 491. Accordingly, Comeau is distinguishable from the case at
bar.
After Comeau., Appellant cites Albanese v. Dominianni, 118 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1953) which, like the previous cases, dealt with an express easement rather
than an easement by necessity. In Albanese, "the easement of access appears to have
been granted for a garage to be erected in the rear of 1150 66th Street. There is no proof
in this record that such a garage was ever constructed." IcL at 348-49. Moreover, the
dominant estate owner (plaintiff) maintained curbing, wooden fencing, and a garden - all
of which prevented the use of the easement by plaintiff. The court relied on this conduct
- conduct by the dominant estate owner - that indicated an intent to abandon the
easement. Id. at 348. Because such conduct by Appellee is completely absent in the case
at bar, Albanese is inapplicable.
Finally, Appellant relies on Canadian Nat. Rv. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175 (Me.
1992) which, like all of Appellant's abandonment cases, concerned an express easement
rather than an easement by necessity. The Sprague court focused on the acts of the
dominant estate holder:
In order to prove intent to abandon, CNR had to show 'unequivocal acts
inconsistent with the further assertion of rights associated with the existence of the
easement.' (Citations omitted). 'The Acts asserted as evidence of abandonment
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must be decisive and conclusive and thereby indicate a clear intent to abandon the
easement.' [citation omitted].
Id. at 1179. The Sprague court then zeroed in on the one critical fact indicating the
dominant estate holder's abandonment: a quit claim deed executed by the dominant estate
holder's predecessor in interest. IdL Thus, not only did Sprague deal with an express
easement, but an affirmative act by the dominant estate holder's predecessor in interest i.e. the quit claim deed - evinced an unequivocal intent to abandon the easement at issue
therein. Such acts by Appellee, or his predecessors in interest, are lacking in the case at
bar.
In sum, the caselaw relied on by Appellant in support of her abandonment claim is
inapplicable to the case at bar. Moreover, the acts Appellant relies on for her
abandonment claim are relate to non-use, or are Appellee's own acts. Such lack of
caselaw and factual support requires the Court to affirm the lower court's denial of
Appellant's abandonment claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee requests that the Court deny Appellant's appeal,
and affirm the lower court's award of summary judgment.
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